A Logical Vise to go with Russell's Teapot. Below we will see how we know
that most religious people are wrong. Many don't care, but some do. I
don't want to offend anyone, but I really care about what's true and what's
made up. This article is addressed to religious people who also care deeply
about whether their beliefs are true (Type 3 below). First, let's look at
the various ways people approach their beliefs:
Type 1
"I don't care if it's true. It feels good. Besides, truth is personal. If
I believe it, it's true for me."
This type of person has had personal, subjective experiences that have
proven to him that certain things are true. He doesn't care whether his
evidence meets scientific standards of objectivity. He admits that there
are limits to what people can believe. People can't believe the earth is
flat, or that they can walk through walls, or that the formula for water is
H3O, etc. But he maintains that scientific proofs don't apply to his own
personal experiences. "They're true for me and you can't disprove them."
The rational response to this position is exemplified by Russell's Teapot.
There could be a giant teapot orbiting the sun. It's too small to be seen
by our best telescopes, so you can't disprove it's there. In such
situations, the burden of proof isn't on us to disprove the existence of the
teapot, but on the believer to provide evidence. Technically, it is true
that we can not definitively disprove anything, but this doesn't mean that
all beliefs are equally likely to be true. I don't have to be agnostic
about the teapot. It's reasonable to be atheistic about the infinity of
imagined and unlikely concoctions.
Type 2
"I think it's true, but I can't prove it."
This is the typical religious person who has either grown up believing or
has adopted a faith. He likes to think his beliefs are well-founded, but
doesn't require that they be. He can see that, for example, belief in
eternal life is at odds with the evidence, but remains firm in his belief
out of "faith". Faith is cultivated as a virtue and trumps all evidence.
Doubt is brushed aside and occasionally severe, but the believer reaffirms
their faith by professing it regularly. There is no argument with reason
here, since the person makes no secret of favoring faith over logic and
evidence.
Type 3
"I know it's true and that's why I believe it. I'd believe it whether it
made me feel good or not."
This is the fundamentalist. This person has made one or more founding
assumptions, such as "the Bible is true" and proceeds from there. They
stake all on this article of faith. This is the type of person who really
cares whether their beliefs are true. A good example of this comes from my
own experience. I once mentioned to my hairdresser that I would never teach
my children about Hell because it would be cruel. The woman replied,
"Unless it was true". This stopped me cold. I realized that I do teach my
children to fear things like strangers, crossing the street, electrical
hazards, etc. because those are real dangers. They're true, so teaching my
kids about them isn't cruel, it's loving. To this woman, Hell is true, so
she lovingly warns her children about it.
Type 3 people are actually the most logically consistent (except for their
founding assumption). The problem lies with the choice of foundation, and
that it is declared off-limits, beyond question, a given. It should be
noted that any manner of belief can be constructed this way. When one
person concocts a belief system, they are considered insane. When thousands
or millions do it, it's called religion.
In the first two types, there was an honest devaluation of reason and
evidence. In this last type, it is claimed that, since the foundational
assumptions are true, the beliefs that proceed from them are reasonable and
true. The only unreasonable aspect (which is key) is that any attempt to
verify or challenge the foundational assumption is out of bounds. This
reaches absurd levels in the case of "the Bible is true". During another
conversation I had with a believer, I pointed out the differing genealogies
of Christ given in the New Testament. "They can't both be true", I told my
friend. He replied, "Yes, they can. God could be using different names for
the same people". When I pointed out that the number of generations was
also a mismatch, he simply said, "I still believe it". The accuracy of the
Bible was a founding assumption that didn't have to be proven or even
logically consistent.
So here we have a person who:
1. Says that whether his beliefs are true is important and that
2. His beliefs are true.
Here comes the vise. Suppose we find another person of this type with
opposing beliefs. Perhaps he is a Muslim fundamentalist. Again, we have a
person who:
1. Says that whether his beliefs are true is important and that
2. His beliefs are true.
Now, we have two people who both claim their beliefs are true. As with Type
1, we can't prove either of them wrong, but now we have an even stronger
argument than Russell's teapot. We can definitely say that one of them is
wrong, even though we don't know which one, because they believe mutually
exclusive things. (Both could be wrong as well.) Now, we don't have to
settle for the standard refutation that sounds like this:
"Technically, I can't disprove your beliefs. You could be right."
Now, we can say with certainty,
"One of you is wrong."
This kind of logical vise doesn't bother Types 1 and 2, since they are ready
to abandon issues of truth. But to a Type 3, this should cause real
discomfort since they really care about what's true. This situation is
actually occurring on a large scale. There are a billion Hindus, a billion
Muslims and a billion Christians. They can't all be right. Most of the
world's faithful are wrong.
My 13-year-old saw a t-shirt that said:
2 billion smokers can't be wrong
We can forget about safety in numbers.
